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Abstract
We present a unified duality approach to Bayesian persuasion. The optimal dual
variable, interpreted as a price function, is shown to be a supergradient of the concave
closure of the objective function at the prior belief. Under regularity conditions, our
general duality result implies known results for the case when the objective function
depends only on the expected state. We apply our approach to characterize the optimal
signal in the case when the state is two-dimensional.
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1 Introduction
Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) show that the optimal signal in a Bayesian persuasion
problem concavifies the objective function in the space of posterior beliefs over the state.1
Although conceptually attractive, concavification is not always a tractable approach. Thus,
several recent papers (see Kolotilin, 2018, Dworczak and Martini, 2019, Galperti and Perego,
2018, and Dizdar and Kova´cˇ, 2019) used duality theory to characterize the optimal signal.
In this paper, we present a unified duality approach to the Bayesian persuasion problem.
Our approach builds on and extends the geometric duality of Gale (1967). We show that
the optimal dual variable is a supergradient of the concave closure of the objective function
at the prior belief (Section 3). Thus, strong duality holds if and only if the concave closure
is superdifferentiable at the prior. This regularity condition is always satisfied when the
state space is finite and the prior has full support (because every finite-dimensional concave
function is superdifferentiable at every interior point). But superdifferentiability may not
hold when the state space is infinite (hence, additional assumptions are needed for strong
duality to hold). We show that strong duality holds if the concave closure has bounded
steepness at the prior, which in turn holds if the objective function is Lipschitz continuous.
We also interpret the general duality result using an analogy to the linear production problem
of Gale (1989), with the dual variable interpreted as the state price function.2
In the special case when the objective function depends only on a finite set of moments of
the posterior distribution (for example, the expected state), we show that the price function
on the space of moments is a convex function that is greater than the objective function (Sec-
tion 4). This result generalizes the duality results established by Kolotilin (2018), Dworczak
and Martini (2019), and Dizdar and Kova´cˇ (2019). We comment on the precise relationship
to these papers in Section 7.
We illustrate the usefulness of the generalized duality approach by characterizing the
optimal signal in the classical case of Rayo and Segal (2010) when the state is two-dimensional
(Section 5). Moreover, relying on a characterization in Doval and Skreta (2018), we show
that our duality results can be easily extended to a constrained persuasion problem in which
the distribution of posterior beliefs must satisfy additional linear constraints (Section 6).
1See also Aumann and Maschler (1995) for an early version of this result.
2Similar interpretations have appeared in Dworczak and Martini (2019) and Galperti and Perego (2018).
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2 Model
The state space Ω is a compact metric space. Let ∆(Ω) be the space of Borel probability
measures on Ω, endowed with the weak? topology. A prior belief µ0 ∈ ∆(Ω) has full support.3
An objective function V : ∆(Ω)→ R is upper semi-continuous.
The persuasion problem in Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011), which will be called the
primal problem, is to find a distribution of posterior beliefs τ ∈ ∆(∆(Ω)) to
maximize
ˆ
∆(Ω)
V (µ)dτ(µ)
subject to
ˆ
∆(Ω)
µdτ(µ) = µ0.
(P)
A probability measure τ that satisfies the constraint in (P) will be called feasible for (P).
Let C(Ω) be the space of continuous functions on Ω. The dual problem is to find a price
function P ∈ C(Ω) to
minimize
ˆ
Ω
P (ω)dµ0(ω)
subject to
ˆ
Ω
P (ω)dµ(ω) ≥ V (µ) for all µ ∈ ∆(Ω).
(D)
A continuous function P that satisfies the constraint in (D) will be called feasible for (D).
We interpret the persuasion problem as a linear production problem of Gale (1989). The
states are economic resources, and the probability measure µ0 is a producer’s endowment of
resources. The set ∆(Ω) is the set of linear production processes available to the producer. A
process µ ∈ ∆(Ω) operated at unit level consumes the measure µ of resources and generates
income V (µ). A production plan τ ∈ ∆(∆(Ω)) describes the level at which each process µ
is operated. The primal problem is for the producer to find a production plan that exhausts
the endowment µ0 and maximizes the total income.
To interpret the dual problem, imagine that there is a wholesaler who wants to buy out
the producer. The wholesaler sets a unit price P (ω) for each resource ω. The producer’s
(opportunity) cost of operating a process µ at unit level is thus
´
Ω
P (ω)dµ(ω). A price
function P ∈ C(Ω) is feasible for the wholesaler if the income generated by each process of
the producer is not greater than the cost of operating the process, which makes the producer
willing to sell all the resources. The dual problem is for the wholesaler to find feasible prices
that minimize the total cost of buying up all the resources.4
3This is effectively without loss of generality because we can always redefine Ω to be supp(µ0).
4Dworczak and Martini (2019) offer a related intuition with the producer replaced by a consumer, pro-
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3 Duality
In this section, we establish weak and strong duality for the persuasion problem. Within
our interpretation, weak duality states that the total income generated by the producer
cannot be greater than the total cost of the resources under prices that make the producer
willing to sell the resources. Moreover, if there exists a plan for the producer and prices for
the wholesaler that equalize the total income with the total cost, then this plan must be
optimal for the producer, and the prices must be optimal for the wholesaler. Strong duality
establishes the existence of such a plan and prices for any endowment of resources.
Theorem 1 (Weak duality). If τ ∈ ∆(∆(Ω)) is feasible for (P) and P ∈ C(Ω) is feasible
for (D), then ˆ
Ω
P (ω)dµ0(ω) ≥
ˆ
∆(Ω)
V (µ)dτ(µ). (G)
Moreover, if (G) holds with equality, that is,
ˆ
Ω
P (ω)dµ0(ω) =
ˆ
∆(Ω)
V (µ)dτ(µ), (O)
then τ and P are optimal solutions to (P) and (D), respectively.
Proof. The proof is standard and hence relegated to Appendix B.1.
We can also show that there is never a duality gap. The value of a problem is defined as
the extremum (supremum of infimum) of the objective function over the feasible set.
Proposition 1 (No duality gap). The problems (P) and (D) have the same value.
Proof. See Appendix B.2.
In the light of Proposition 1, strong duality will hold if the problems (P) and (D) have
optimal solutions. Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) show that the problem (P) always has
an optimal solution and its value is equal to the concave closure of the objective function at
the prior.5 The concave closure of V at µ is defined as
V̂ (µ) = inf {H(µ)|H : ∆(Ω)→ R, H ≥ V, H is affine and continuous} .
duction plans by consumption bundles, and the wholesaler by a Walrasian auctioneer who sets prices in a
“Persuasion economy” to clear the market.
5See the Online Appendix of Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) for the result when Ω is infinite. Kamenica
and Gentzkow use a different definition of a concave closure but it can be shown to be equivalent to our
definition when V is upper semi-continuous (we adopt Definition 7.4 from Aliprantis and Border, 2006).
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The concave closure is a concave upper semi-continuous function. However, the problem (D)
does not always have an optimal solution. So we need to impose a regularity condition.
Definition 1. The persuasion problem is regular if V̂ is superdifferentiable at µ0: There
exists an affine continuous function V : ∆(Ω) → R such that V (µ0) = V̂ (µ0) and V (µ) ≥
V̂ (µ) for all µ ∈ ∆(Ω).
We will refer to the function V defined above as the supporting hyperplane of V̂ at µ0.
By the Riesz-Markov-Kakutani representation theorem, every linear continuous function H
on ∆(Ω) can be represented as H(µ) =
´
Ω
P (ω)dµ(ω) for some function P ∈ C(Ω). Thus,
V̂ is superdifferentiable at µ0 if and only if V̂ has a supergradient at µ0 defined as a function
P ∈ C(Ω) such that V̂ (µ)− V̂ (µ0) ≤
´
Ω
P (ω)d(µ− µ0)(ω) for all µ ∈ ∆(Ω).
When Ω is finite, the persuasion problem is regular. This is because every finite-
dimensional concave function is superdifferentiable at every interior point of its domain
(the full-support assumption makes sure that µ0 lies in the interior of the set of probabil-
ity measures). However, when Ω is infinite, the set of probability measures has an empty
(relative) interior in the weak? topology – any µ0 is a boundary point. As a result, the hyper-
plane separating (µ0, V̂ (µ0)) from the graph of V̂ may be vertical, and hence a supporting
hyperplane of V̂ may fail to exist.6 A second difficulty is that in infinite-dimensional spaces
concavity and upper semi-continuity of a function is not in general sufficient for existence of
a supporting hyperplane even at interior points.7
In Appendix A, we show that a sufficient condition for regularity to hold is that V̂ has
“bounded steepness” at µ0 – the marginal increase in the value of the persuasion problem is
bounded above for a small perturbation of the prior. A sufficient condition for this property
is, for example, that V is Lipschitz continuous.8
Theorem 2 (Strong duality). The problems (P) and (D) have optimal solutions that satisfy
(O) (strong duality holds) if and only if the persuasion problem is regular.
The proof below shows that the optimal price function can be identified with a supergra-
dient of the concave closure of V at the prior µ0. Geometrically, any price function P defines
a hyperplane on ∆(Ω) that passes through each extreme point (δω, P (ω)), where δω is the
Dirac measure at ω. The price function P is feasible for (D) if the corresponding hyperplane
6The difficulty can be understood by considering a concave continuous function f(x) =
√
x on [0, 1].
That function is not superdifferentiable at the boundary point x = 0 because the supporting hyperplane
would have to be vertical.
7For example, Brøndsted and Rockafellar (1965) construct a concave upper semi-continuous function that
is nowhere superdifferentiable.
8See Appendix A. That last condition can be significantly relaxed in more specific instances of the problem,
as in Dworczak and Martini (2019) or Dizdar and Kova´cˇ (2019).
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Figure 3.1: An objective function V and the optimal price function P ? in the case of a binary
state, Ω = {0, 1}.
lies above V on ∆(Ω). The dual problem reduces to finding a hyperplane that lies above V
and whose value at the prior µ0 is minimized. Thus, the optimal hyperplane is a hyperplane
that supports the concave closure of V at µ0, and the optimal price P
?(ω) of state ω is the
value of the supporting hyperplane at δω (see Figure 3.1).
Proof. If. Given that Ω is a compact metric space and V is upper semi-continuous, there
exists an optimal solution τ ? for each prior µ0 ∈ ∆(Ω) (see the Online Appendix of Kamenica
and Gentzkow, 2011 or our Appendix B.3). Moreover, Kamenica and Gentzkow show that
V̂ (µ0) =
ˆ
∆(Ω)
V (µ)dτ ?(µ).
If the persuasion problem is regular, V̂ has a supporting hyperplane V at µ0. Consider
P ?(ω) = V (δω). Because V is affine, for all µ ∈ ∆(Ω),
V (µ) =
ˆ
Ω
V (δω)dµ(ω) =
ˆ
Ω
P ?(ω)dµ(ω).
Moreover, P ? ∈ C(Ω), because V is continuous in the weak? topology. Finally, because V is
a supporting hyperplane of V̂ at µ0,
ˆ
Ω
P ?(ω)dµ0(ω) = V̂ (µ0) and
ˆ
Ω
P ?(ω)dµ(ω) ≥ V̂ (µ) for all µ ∈ ∆(Ω),
showing that P ? satisfies (O) and is feasible for (D). Thus, strong duality holds by Theorem 1.
Only if. Suppose that strong duality holds and let P ? ∈ C(Ω) be an optimal solution to
(D). Define an affine continuous function V : ∆(Ω)→ R by V (µ) = ´
Ω
P ?(ω)dµ(ω). Then,
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we know from (O) that V (µ0) = V̂ (µ0). Moreover, for all µ ∈ ∆(Ω), we have
V (µ) =
ˆ
Ω
P ?(ω)dµ(ω) ≥ V (µ).
Because V is an affine continuous function such that V ≥ V , it follows from the definition
of V̂ that V̂ (µ) ≤ V (µ) for all µ ∈ ∆(Ω). But this shows that V is a supporting hyperplane
of V̂ at µ0. Thus, the persuasion problem is regular.
An important implication of duality theory is complementary slackness, which gives a
simple way to verify whether a candidate solution to the primal problem is optimal. Within
our interpretation, complementary slackness states that if the cost of operating a process
exceeds the income it generates, then this process will not be operated.
Corollary 1 (Complementary slackness). The feasible distribution τ and the feasible price
function P are optimal solutions to (P) and (D), respectively, if and only if
supp(τ) ⊆
{
µ ∈ ∆(Ω) :
ˆ
Ω
P (ω)dµ(ω) = V (µ)
}
. (C)
Proof. The proof is standard and hence relegated to Appendix B.4.
Corollary 1 does not require regularity of the persuasion problem. To illustrate how it
can be used, we derive the well-known condition in Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) for the
optimality of full disclosure. Under full disclosure, the support of τ is the set of all δω.
Condition (C) thus simplifies to the requirement that P (ω) = V (δω) for all ω. Substituting
P in the constraint of (D) yields that full disclosure is optimal if and only if
´
Ω
V (δω)dµ(ω) ≥
V (µ) for all µ ∈ ∆(Ω).9
4 Moment Persuasion
We now show how our approach specializes to the case of a persuasion problem in which the
objective function depends only on certain moments of the posterior.
Assume that V (µ) = v
(´
Ω
m(ω)dµ(ω)
)
for all µ ∈ ∆(Ω), some continuous m : Ω→ RN ,
and some upper semi-continuous v : RN → R. Let X be the space of moments, that is, the
convex hull of the set m(Ω), and let F0 be the distribution of x = m(ω) induced by the prior
µ0 over ω.
9This condition, referred to as outer-convexity of V , also appears in Dworczak and Martini (2019).
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Under these assumptions, a distribution τ of posterior beliefs µ matters only through the
induced distribution G of moments Eµ[m(ω)]. By Strassen’s Theorem (see Gentzkow and
Kamenica, 2016 and Kolotilin, 2018 for details), G ∈ ∆(X) is induced by some τ ∈ ∆(∆(Ω))
that is feasible for (P) if and only if G is smaller than the prior F0 in the convex order
(denoted by G ≤cx F0). Summing up, the primal problem (P) reduces to the problem of
finding a distribution of moments G ∈ ∆(X) to
maximize
ˆ
Ω
v(x)dG(x)
subject to G ≤cx F0.
(Pm)
Given that the primal problem only depends on the distribution of moments, it is natural
to conjecture that it is also sufficient to find prices of moments. The key insight of this section
is that prices for moments can be derived from the prices of states P by finding the “cheapest”
way in which a given moment x can be generated by pooling the states:
p(x) = min
{ˆ
Ω
P (ω)dµ(ω) : µ ∈ ∆(Ω) and
ˆ
Ω
m(ω)dµ(ω) = x
}
. (M)
In particular, we will show that the dual problem (D) reduces to the problem of finding a
price function p ∈ C(X) to
minimize
ˆ
Ω
p(x)dF0(x)
subject to p(x) ≥ v(x) for all x ∈ X,
p is convex on X.
(Dm)
The primal and the dual problems have similar interpretations as before, with the differ-
ence that the producer operates a linear production technology with X being both the set of
resources and the set of available production processes. To see why we obtain convex prices
in the dual, note that the producer can always transform a measure G ∈ ∆(X) of resources
into one unit of resource x′ = EG[x]. If prices failed to be convex, the producer could sell at
effectively higher prices by engaging in such transformations. Thus, the wholesaler may as
well offer convex prices from the beginning.
Theorem 3. If G ∈ ∆(X) is feasible for (Pm), p ∈ C(X) is feasible for (Dm), and
ˆ
X
p(x)dF0(x) =
ˆ
X
v(x)dG(x), (Om)
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then G and p are optimal solutions to (Pm) and (Dm), respectively.
The problems (Pm) and (Dm) have optimal solutions that satisfy (Om) if and only if the
persuasion problem is regular.
Proof. We prove two lemmas first.
Lemma 1. If p ∈ C(X) is feasible for (Dm), then P ∈ C(Ω) defined by P (ω) = p(m(ω)) is
feasible for (D).
Proof. If p ∈ C(X) is feasible for (Dm), then P ∈ C(Ω) is feasible for (D) because
ˆ
Ω
P (ω)dµ(ω) =
ˆ
Ω
p(m(ω))dµ(ω) ≥ p
(ˆ
Ω
m(ω)dµ(ω)
)
≥ v
(ˆ
Ω
m(ω)dµ(ω)
)
= V (µ).
Lemma 2. If P ∈ C(Ω) is feasible for (D), then p ∈ C(X) defined by (M) is feasible for
(Dm). Moreover, p(m(ω)) ≤ P (ω) for all ω ∈ Ω.
Proof. Suppose that P ∈ C(Ω) is feasible for (D). The minimum in the definition (M) of p is
attained at some µx and p ∈ C(X) because the objective is continuous in the weak? topology
and the feasible set is a compact-valued continuous correspondence. For each x ∈ X,
p(x) =
ˆ
Ω
P (ω)dµx(ω) ≥ V (µx) = v(x).
Moreover, for each λ ∈ (0, 1), x1, x2 ∈ X,
λp(x1) + (1− λ)p(x2) = λ
ˆ
Ω
P (ω)dµx1(ω) + (1− λ)
ˆ
Ω
P (ω)dµx2(ω)
=
ˆ
Ω
P (ω)d (λµx1(ω) + (1− λ)µx2(ω)) ≥
ˆ
Ω
P (ω)dµλx1+(1−λ)x2(ω) = p(λx1 + (1− λ)x2),
where the inequality follows from the definition of µx. Thus, p ∈ C(X) is feasible for (Dm).
Finally, by the definition of p and δω, for each ω ∈ Ω,
p(m(ω)) =
ˆ
Ω
P (ω′)dµm(ω)(ω′) ≤
ˆ
Ω
P (ω′)dδω(ω′) = P (ω).
Since (P) reduces to (Pm) under the assumptions of this section, Theorems 1 and 2 imply
a version of Theorem 3 in which p(x), F0(x), and (Dm) are replaced with P (ω), µ0(ω), and
(D) in the statement. Thus, to prove Theorem 3, it suffices to show that the problems (Dm)
and (D) have the same value and that (Dm) has an optimal solution if and only if (D) does.
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If p ∈ C(X) is feasible for (Dm), then P ∈ C(Ω) given by Lemma 1 is feasible for (D) and
ˆ
Ω
P (ω)dµ0(ω) =
ˆ
Ω
p(m(ω))dµ0(ω) =
ˆ
X
p(x)dF0(x),
where the first equality is by definition of P and the second by definition of F0. Conversely,
if P ∈ C(Ω) is feasible for (D), then p ∈ C(X) given by Lemma 2 is feasible for (Dm) and
ˆ
X
p(x)dF0(x) =
ˆ
Ω
p(m(ω))dµ0(ω) ≤
ˆ
Ω
P (ω)dµ0(ω).
Thus, the problems (Dm) and (D) have the same value. Moreover, if p is an optimal solution
to (Dm), then P given by Lemma 1 is an optimal solution to (D). Finally, if P is an optimal
solution to (D), then p given by Lemma 2 is an optimal solution to (Dm).
In Appendix A, we show that the moment persuasion problem is regular if v is Lipschitz
continuous. Other authors have identified weaker sufficient conditions on v in the case when
ω ∈ R and m(ω) = ω (see especially Dizdar and Kova´cˇ, 2019).
5 Application: Two-Dimensional Moment Persuasion
Consider the following special case of moment persuasion. The set Ω is a compact set in
R2+, with a generic element denoted by ω = (ω1, ω2). The objective function is V (µ) =(´
Ω
ω1dµ(ω)
) (´
Ω
ω2dµ(ω)
)
, so that m(ω) = ω and v(x1, x2) = x1x2. Thus, the vector of
moments x = Eµ[m(ω)] is the posterior mean Eµ[ω], the space of posterior means X is the
convex hull of Ω, and the prior F0 over X coincides with the prior µ0 over Ω. Because the
function v is Lipschitz continuous on any compact domain, it follows from Proposition 4 in
Appendix A that the persuasion problem is regular.
This special case has been studied by Rayo and Segal (2010) and Nikandrova and Pancs
(2017) under the assumption that the set Ω is a finite set and a strictly convex curve,
respectively. They derive certain necessary properties of an optimal solution. In contrast,
our approach allows Ω to be any compact set and it enables characterisation of necessary
and sufficient conditions for a candidate solution to be optimal.
As an illustration, we provide conditions under which it is optimal to reveal only some
linear combination of ω1 and ω2. A simple implication of this characterization is that it is
optimal to reveal ω1 + ω2 if the prior is symmetric around the line ω2 = ω1.
Proposition 2. Let G be the distribution of posterior means induced by revelation of ω2+aω1
where a > 0. If the support of G belongs to a line {(x1, x2) : x2 = ax1 + b}, with b ∈ R, then
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G is an optimal solution to (Pm).
Conversely, suppose additionally that Ω is convex and has a non-empty interior; then, G
is an optimal solution to (Pm) only if the support of G belongs to a line {(x1, x2) : x2 =
ax1 + b}, with b ∈ R.
Proof. Define
θ = ω2 + aω1,
Ω(θ) = {ω ∈ Ω : ω2 + aω1 = θ},
x(θ) = (x1(θ), x2(θ)) = E[(ω1, ω2)|(ω1, ω2) ∈ Ω(θ)] = E[ω|θ].
That is, revealing that ω2 + aω1 = θ induces the posterior mean x(θ).
If. Suppose that the support of G induced by revelation of ω2 + aω1 belongs to a line
{(x1, x2) : x2 = ax1 + b}, with b ∈ R. Thus, a state (ω1, ω2) ∈ Ω induces a posterior mean
(x1(θ), x2(θ)), with θ = ω2 + aω1, that satisfies
x2(θ) = ax1(θ) + b and x2(θ) + ax1(θ) = θ;
so
x1(θ) =
θ − b
2a
and x2(θ) =
θ + b
2
.
Thus, the value of (Pm) at G is
ˆ
X
x1x2dG(x1, x2) =
ˆ
Ω
(ω2 + aω1)
2 − b2
4a
dF0(ω1, ω2). (5.1)
Consider p ∈ C(X) given by
p(x1, x2) = x1x2 +
(x2 − ax1 − b)2
4a
.
The Hessian matrix, which consists of second-order partial derivatives of p, is[
p11 p12
p21 p22
]
=
[
a
2
1
2
1
2
1
2a
]
.
Since the Hessian matrix is positive semidefinite, p is convex on X. Moreover, we have that
p(x1, x2) ≥ x1x2 = v(x1, x2) for all (x1, x2) ∈ X. Thus, p ∈ C(X) is feasible for (Dm).
10
The value of (Dm) at p is
ˆ
Ω
p(ω1, ω2)dF0(ω1, ω2) =
ˆ
Ω
(
ω1ω2 +
(ω2 − aω1 − b)2
4a
)
dF0(ω1, ω2)
=
ˆ
Ω
(ω2 + aω1)
2 − b2
4a
dF0(ω1, ω2)
− b
2a
ˆ
Ω
(ω2 − (aω1 + b))dF0(ω1, ω2)
=
ˆ
Ω
(ω2 + aω1)
2 − b2
4a
dF0(ω1, ω2), (5.2)
where the last equality holds because
E[ω2 − (aω1 + b)] = E[E[ω2 − (aω1 + b)|θ]] = E[x2(θ)− (ax1(θ) + b)] = 0.
Equations (5.1) and (5.2) imply that (Om) holds, and thus, by Theorem 3, G and p are
optimal solutions to (Pm) and (Dm).
Only if. The strategy for the proof is to observe that optimality of G imposes tight
restrictions on a candidate price functions to achieve the lower bound identified by condition
(Om). After constructing a parametric class of candidate price functions, we show that
convexity of the optimal p pins down a unique candidate for the support of G, delivering the
desired result. We sketch the main argument below and relegate some technical details to
Appendix B.5.
Suppose that the additional assumption holds and it is optimal to reveal the value of
ω2 + aω1. For any p ∈ C(X) that is feasible for (Dm), we have
E[p(ω)] = E[E[p(ω)|θ]]
(1)
≥ E[p(E[ω|θ])] = E[p(x(θ))]
(2)
≥ E[v(x(θ))],
where (1) holds because p is convex, and (2) holds because p ≥ v. By Theorem 3, there
exists an optimal p ∈ C(X) that satisfies
E[p(ω)] = E[v(x(θ))];
so the inequalities (1) and (2) above hold with equality. Since the support of F0 is a compact
convex set Ω, the support of the distribution of θ induced by F0 is an interval Θ = [θ, θ].
Therefore,
(1) p(ω) is affine in ω on Ω(θ) for each θ ∈ Θ (so that inequality (1) holds with equality);
(2) p(x(θ)) = v(x(θ)) for each θ ∈ Θ (so that inequality (2) holds with equality).
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Since p ≥ v, conditions (1) and (2) imply that, for each θ ∈ Θ and ω ∈ Ω(θ), we have
p(ω) = v(x(θ)) + ∂v(x(θ))(ω − x(θ)),
where ∂v(x(θ)) is the gradient of v at x(θ). Since v(x1, x2) = x1x2, we have ∂v(x(θ)) =
(x2(θ), x1(θ)), and
p(ω1, ω2) = x1(θ)x2(θ) + x2(θ)(ω1 − x1(θ)) + x1(θ)(ω2 − x2(θ))
= ω1x2(θ) + ω2x1(θ)− x1(θ)x2(θ).
Substituting θ = ω2 + aω1 and x2(θ) = θ − ax1(θ) yields, for each ω ∈ Ω,
p(ω1, ω2) = ω1ω2 + a(x1(ω2 + aω1)− ω1)2. (5.3)
The function p(ω) is convex on a convex set Ω with a non-empty interior: We show in
Lemma 7 in Appendix B.5 that this can only be true when x(θ) belongs to a line {(x1, x2) :
x2 = ax1 + b}, with b ∈ R.
In the converse of Proposition 2, it is possible to replace the assumption that Ω is convex
and has a non-empty interior with a weaker assumption that the support of G is a connected
set that lies almost everywhere in the interior of X. This weaker assumption allows Ω to
be a curve, as in Nikandrova and Pancs (2017). In Appendix B.5, we provide examples
illustrating that the assumption on Ω cannot be entirely relaxed: For example, the converse
of Proposition 2 may fail if Ω is a finite set or when its convex hull has an empty interior.
6 Extension to Constrained Persuasion
A number of papers analyze a Bayesian persuasion problem with constraints (see Doval and
Skreta (2018) and references therein). Our analysis extends easily to this case.
Suppose that for each k = 1, . . . , K, gk : ∆(Ω)→ R is a continuous function, and ck is a
scalar. The primal problem is now to find τ ∈ ∆(∆(Ω)) to
maximize
ˆ
∆(Ω)
V (µ)dτ(µ)
subject to
ˆ
∆(Ω)
µdτ(µ) = µ0,
ˆ
∆(Ω)
gk(µ)dτ(µ) ≤ ck for all k = 1, . . . , K.
(Pc)
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We assume throughout that there exists a distribution τ satisfying the constraints of (Pc).
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The dual problem is to find a function P ∈ C(Ω) and non-negative scalars Pk, for
k = 1, . . . , K, to
minimize
ˆ
Ω
P (ω)dµ0(ω) +
K∑
k=1
Pkck
subject to
ˆ
Ω
P (ω)dµ(ω) +
K∑
k=1
Pkgk(µ) ≥ V (µ) for all µ ∈ ∆(Ω).
(Dc)
The interpretation of the primal problem is as follows. The producer now faces additional
technological constraints. There are K factors of production, and the producer is endowed
with ck units of each factor k. A process µ ∈ ∆(Ω) operated at unit level consumes the
measure µ of resources and gk(µ) units of each factor k. Since the additional technological
constraints take the form of inequalities, the producer can freely dispose of each factor k.
In the dual problem, the wholesaler, who wants to buy up all the resources and factors,
sets a unit price P (ω) for each resource ω and a unit price Pk for each factor k. Since the
producer can freely dispose of each factor k, each price Pk is non-negative.
To establish conditions for strong duality, we follow Doval and Skreta (2018), and define
a function V g1,...,gk : ∆(Ω)× RK → R by
V g1,...,gk(µ, x) =
V (µ), if gk(µ) ≤ xk for k = 1, ..., K,−∞, otherwise.
Then, as Doval and Skreta show,11 the value of the problem (Pc) – when the prior is µ0
and the right hand side of the constraints in (Pc) is given by a vector c ∈ RK – is equal to
the concave closure of the function V g1,...,gk at (µ0, c), denoted V̂
g1,...,gk(µ0, c). The function
V̂ g1,...,gk is concave and upper semi-continuous. We present the following result without a
proof as it follows from the same reasoning as in Theorems 1 and 2.
Theorem 4. If τ is feasible for (Pc) and (P, P1, ..., PK) is feasible for (Dc), and
ˆ
Ω
P (ω)dµ0(ω) +
K∑
k=1
Pkck =
ˆ
∆(Ω)
V (µ)dτ(µ), (Oc)
10While problem (Pc) only contains inequality constraints, an equality constraint of the form´
∆(Ω)
g(µ)dτ(µ) = c can be restated as the two inequality constraints
´
∆(Ω)
g(µ)dτ(µ) ≤ c and´
∆(Ω)
(−g(µ))dτ(µ) ≤ −c.
11Formally, they work with a finite state space but their proof technique extends to the case of a compact
metric state space.
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then τ and P are optimal solutions to (Pc) and (Dc), respectively.
The problems (Pc) and (Dc) have optimal solutions that satisfy (Oc) if and only if V̂
g1,...,gk
is superdifferentiable at (µ0, c).
Concavity of V̂ g1,...,gk implies that strong duality holds when Ω is finite.
7 Relationship to Existing Duality Results
Our approach builds on and extends the geometric duality of Gale (1967). Gale shows that
the Kuhn-Tucker Theorem holds for a convex optimization problem in a normed space if
and only if the value function is superdifferentiable at the primal constraint. The persua-
sion problem is a linear-programming problem on the space of probability measures, ∆(Ω).
Importantly, we cannot endow ∆(Ω) with a norm because the weak? topology (which we
need to obtain prices by applying the representation theorem for linear functionals) is not
normable when Ω is infinite. Thus, Gale’s result cannot be applied directly in our setting.
Instead, we show that his approach can be extended to the metric space ∆(Ω). Gale also
shows that a concave function defined on a normed space is superdifferentiable at a point if
and only if it has bounded steepness at this point. In Appendix A, we generalize the “if”
part of this result to the metric space ∆(Ω) and show (by means of a counterexample) that
the “only if” part of the result does not extend.
The results of this paper generalize some existing results in the persuasion literature. The
linear persuasion problem in which the objective function depends only on the expected one-
dimensional state has received special attention (see, for example, Gentzkow and Kamenica,
2016, Kolotilin et al., 2017, Kolotilin, 2018, Dworczak and Martini, 2019, and Dizdar and
Kova´cˇ, 2019). Linear persuasion is the special case of moment persuasion when ω ∈ R and
m(ω) = ω. It is important to emphasize, however, that while our main duality result is
mathematically more general than the existing ones (in the sense that it applies on a larger
domain of problems), previous papers identify useful (easier to verify) regularity conditions
on the primitives under which strong duality holds. Our regularity condition is necessary for
strong duality so it implies all existing sufficient conditions but verifying it may be difficult
in practice.
When the persuasion problem is regular, Theorem 3 generalizes Theorems 1 and 2 in
Dworczak and Martini (2019): By a simple transformation, Theorem 3 establishes existence
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of a convex continuous function p? and a distribution G? such that
supp(G?) ⊆ {x ∈ X : p?(x) = v(x)},ˆ
Ω
p?(x)dF0(x) =
ˆ
Ω
p?(x)dG?(x),
G? ≤cx F0, and p? ≥ v.
Moreover, the theorem resolves (positively) the conjecture of Dworczak and Martini that
if the objective function V is measurable with respect to a moment m(ω), then so is the
corresponding price function.
To date, Dizdar and Kova´cˇ (2019) identify the most permissive condition on v for the
linear persuasion problem to be regular (and hence for strong duality to hold). Our proof
of no-duality gap (Proposition 1) uses similar techniques to theirs but the proof strategy for
strong duality is different: Dizdar and Kova´cˇ show that the problem (D) has an optimal
solution by demonstrating that feasible solutions can be restricted to a compact set; in
contrast, we construct the optimal solution (a price function on the space of moments) from
the supergradient of the concave closure of V .
Our approach also allows us to simplify the duality result for the general persuasion
problem in Dworczak and Martini (2019): They define a price function on the space of
beliefs ∆(Ω) and require it to be “outer-convex” (a relaxation of convexity). Our results
demonstrate that such a price function exists (strong duality holds) when the problem is
regular (for example, when V is Lipschitz continuous), and that the price can in fact be
taken to be linear by extending (linearly) the price function P defined on the state space Ω.
Kolotilin (2018) and Galperti and Perego (2018) use an alternative approach to the
persuasion problem. Instead of working with an objective function V : ∆(Ω) → R, they
consider a sender and a receiver whose utility functions are w : Ω×A→ R and u : Ω×A→ R
where A is the space of the receiver’s actions. Moreover, instead of choosing a distribution
of posterior beliefs τ ∈ ∆(∆(Ω)), the sender chooses a joint distribution pi ∈ ∆(Ω×A) of the
state ω and the recommended action a. On top of the Bayes plausibility constraint, pi must
satisfy the obedience constraint, which requires each recommended action to be incentive-
compatible for the receiver given the beliefs it induces. Our approach is simpler because it
sidesteps the obedience constraint, but the alternative approach can be more easily extended
to allow for a privately informed receiver and multiple receivers.
Generally, it is possible to reformulate the alternative problem as our problem, and vice
versa. To illustrate this point suppose that Ω is a finite set. Consider an alternative problem
in which the sender’s and receiver’s utility functions are w(ω, a) and u(ω, a). Kamenica
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and Gentzkow (2011) show that this problem is equivalent to our problem in which the
objective function is V (µ) = Eµ[w(ω, a?(µ))] with a?(µ) ∈ arg maxa Eµ[u(ω, a)]. Conversely,
consider our problem in which the objective function is V . This problem is equivalent to the
alternative problem in which the action space is A = ∆(Ω), and the sender’s and receiver’s
utility functions are w(ω, a) = V (a) and u(ω, a) = 2a(ω) −∑ω′∈Ω a2(ω′). Indeed, given a
posterior µ, the receiver takes an action a?(µ) = µ, which maximizes his expected utility∑
ω∈Ω(2a(ω)µ(ω)− a2(ω)), and thus the objective function is V (µ).
To compare our and alternative approaches, consider the linear persuasion problem. Let
A = Ω. The alternative dual problem in Kolotilin (2018) is to find a function q ∈ C(Ω) and
a bounded measurable function r : A→ R to
minimize
ˆ
Ω
q(ω)dµ0(ω)
subject to q(ω) + r(a)(a− ω) ≥ v(a) for all (ω, a) ∈ Ω× A,
(Da)
where q and r are multipliers for the Bayes plausibility and obedience constraints. Observe
that if p? is an optimal solution to (Dm), then (q
?, r?) = (p?, ∂p?) is an optimal solution to
(Da). This is so because (q
?, r?) yields the same value and is feasible, as follows from
p?(ω) + ∂p?(a)(a− ω) ≥ p?(a) ≥ v(a),
where the first inequality is by convexity of p? and the second is by p? ≥ v. Thus, q has the
same interpretation as p, but an economic interpretation of r remains elusive. Finally, using
Theorem 3, it is straightforward to reproduce the conditions in Kolotilin’s Proposition 3 for
“interval revelation” to be optimal.
Appendix
A Regularity of the Persuasion Problem
In this appendix, we present various sufficient conditions under which the persuasion problem
is regular. We will denote by M(Ω) the set of signed Borel measures of bounded variation
on Ω, and by M+(Ω) the subset of non-negative measures. Weak convergence of (signed)
measures µn to µ will be denoted by µn
w→ µ.
Let d : M(Ω) ×M(Ω) → R denote the Kantorovich-Rubinstein distance between mea-
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sures: For any µ, η ∈M(Ω),
d(µ, η) = sup
{ˆ
Ω
f(ω)d(µ− η)(ω)| f ∈ Lip1(Ω), sup
ω∈Ω
|f(ω)| ≤ 1
}
,
where Lip1(Ω) is the set of 1-Lipschitz functions on Ω. Because Ω is assumed to be a compact
metric space (hence separable), d is a metric that metrizes weak? topology on the space of
non-negative measures M+(Ω) (by Theorem 8.3.2. in Bogachev, 2007).
We say that V̂ : ∆(Ω)→ R has bounded steepness at µ0 if there exists a constant L such
that, for all µ ∈ ∆(Ω),
V̂ (µ)− V̂ (µ0)
d(µ, µ0)
≤ L.
Intuitively, bounded steepness rules out the possibility that the function V̂ has an unbounded
slope from µ0 to µ. We show that this condition is sufficient to obtain a regular persuasion
problem. The proof is complicated by the fact there exist “vertical” hyperplanes separating
the graph of V̂ from the point (µ0, V̂ (µ0)): For example, a linear continuous functional
H : M(Ω) × R → R given by H(µ, α) = µ(Ω) is a separating hyperplane but not a proper
one. The trick is to first extend the domain of the function V̂ to non-probability measures,
and only then apply a result about separating convex cones from their vertices.
Theorem 5. If V̂ has bounded steepness at µ0, then the persuasion problem is regular.
Proof. Define the space ∆2(Ω) := {κµ : µ ∈ ∆(Ω), κ ∈ [0, 2]} of non-negative measures
that assign a weight of at most 2 to the space Ω. We prove three lemmas first.
Lemma 3. Suppose that µ and η are probability measures. Then, for any λ ∈ R, d(µ, λη) ≥
1
2
d(µ, η).
Proof of Lemma 3. Suppose that δ = d(µ, η). Since Ω is compact, the Arzela´-Ascoli theorem
implies that the supremum in the definition of d is attained at some function f ∈ Lip1(Ω),
supω∈Ω |f(ω)| ≤ 1 such that δ =
´
Ω
f(ω)d(µ − η)(ω). It is enough to construct a function
g ∈ Lip1(Ω), supω∈Ω |g(ω)| ≤ 1 such that
´
Ω
g(ω)d(µ− λη)(ω) ≥ δ/2. Let
g(ω) =
1
2
(
f(ω)−
ˆ
Ω
f(ω′)dη(ω′)
)
.
Because η is a probability measure and |f(ω)| ≤ 1 for all ω, the function g is indeed feasible.
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Moreover, we have
ˆ
Ω
g(ω)d(µ−λη)(ω) =
ˆ
Ω
g(ω)d(µ−η)(ω)−(λ−1)
ˆ
Ω
g(ω)dη(ω)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
=
ˆ
Ω
f(ω)
2
d(µ−η)(ω) = δ
2
,
where the second to last inequality holds because µ and η are probability measures.
Lemma 4. There exists an extension of V̂ to ∆2(Ω) that is concave and has bounded steep-
ness at µ0.
Proof of Lemma 4. Extend V̂ to ∆2(Ω) by
V̂ (η) = η(Ω)V̂
(
η
η(Ω)
)
,
and V̂ (0) = 0. It follows (by directly checking the definition) that V̂ remains concave. We
will show that V̂ has bounded steepness at µ0 with a constant 2L+ V¯ , where V¯ is the upper
bound on V̂ on ∆(Ω) (which exists because V̂ is upper-semicontinuous).
Let ηn
w→ µ0. We can represent ηn = λnµn, where λn = ηn(Ω), and µn = ηn/λn ∈ ∆(Ω).
When looking at the sequence V̂ (µn)− V̂ (µ0), it is without loss of generality to assume that
V̂ (µn) ≥ V̂ (µ0) for all n (by passing to a subsequence if necessary, as otherwise the bound
we are trying to prove is trivially satisfied). By Lemma 3, we have
V̂ (ηn)− V̂ (µ0)
d(ηn, µ0)
=
V̂ (µn)− V̂ (µ0)
d(ηn, µ0)
+
λn − 1
d(ηn, µ0)
V̂ (µn) ≤ V̂ (µn)− V̂ (µ0)1
2
d(µn, µ0)
+
|λn − 1|
d(ηn, µ0)
V¯ .
Note that d(ηn, µ0) ≥ |λn− 1| because we can always set f = 1 and f = −1 in the definition
of the metric d, and hence the right hand side converges to a number L′ ≤ 2L+ V¯ .
Lemma 5. If µn is a sequence in M(Ω), and µn
w→ 0, then d(µn, 0)→ 0.
Proof of Lemma 5. Suppose not; then there exists  > 0 and a sequence of functions fn ∈
Lip1(Ω), supω∈Ω |fn(ω)| ≤ 1 such that
´
Ω
fn(ω)dµn(ω) > . By the Arzela´-Ascoli theorem,
the space of such functions on a compact domain is compact, so we can choose a subsequence
of fn that converges uniformly to some f (that is in particular continuous). We have
ˆ
Ω
f(ω)dµn(ω) =
ˆ
Ω
fn(ω)dµn(ω) +
ˆ
Ω
(f(ω)− fn(ω))dµn(ω) ≥ /2,
for large enough n since the second term converges to 0. This directly contradicts the
definition of µn converging to 0 in the weak
? topology.
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We note that Lemma 5 has a converse only on the space of non-negative measures (be-
cause d metrizes weak? topology on that space but not on M(Ω)).
Now we can finish the proof of Theorem 5. Define
A = hyp(V̂ ) =
{
(µ, α) : α ≤ V̂ (µ), µ ∈ ∆2(Ω)
}
and
B =
{
(µ0, V̂ (µ0)
}
.
According to Lemma 7.20 in Aliprantis and Border, separating A and B is possible if the
closed convex cone generated by the set A − B is not equal to the entire space M(Ω) × R.
That is, we have to show that the convex closure of the set{
λ(µ− µ0, α− V̂ (µ0)) : λ ≥ 0, α ≤ V̂ (µ), µ ∈ ∆2(Ω)
}
is not equal to M(Ω) × R. Notice that this set is already a convex cone, so separation is
possible if there exists some η ∈ M(Ω) and β ∈ R such that there is no sequence λn ≥ 0,
αn ≤ V̂ (µn), µn ∈ ∆2(Ω) such that λn(µn − µ0, αn − V̂ (µ0)) w→ (η, β). Take (η, β) = (0, 1),
and, towards a contradiction, suppose that such a sequence exists. In particular, we must
have λn(µn − µ0) w→ 0. By Lemma 4, there exists L′ such that
αn − V̂ (µ0)
d(µn, µ0)
≤ V̂ (µn)− V̂ (µ0)
d(µn, µ0)
≤ L′,
and therefore,
lim
n→∞
λn(αn − V̂ (µ0)) = lim
n→∞
αn − V̂ (µ0)
d(µn, µ0)
λnd(µn, µ0)
≤ L′ lim
n→∞
λnd(µn, µ0) = L
′ lim
n→∞
d(λnµn, λnµ0) = 0,
by the properties of d and Lemma 5. This is a contradiction.
Therefore, sets A and B can be separated: There exists a non-zero linear continuous
functional on M(Ω) × R, denoted (Φ, φ), that achieves its maximum over the set A at
(µ0, V̂ (µ0)), in particular,
Φµ0 + φV̂ (µ0) ≥ Φµ+ φV̂ (µ),∀µ ∈ ∆2(Ω). (A.1)
Suppose that φ = 0. Because a linear continuous functional in the weak? topology can be
identified with a continuous function on Ω (by the Riesz-Markov-Kakutani theorem), we
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have some f ∈ C(Ω), not identically 0, such that
ˆ
Ω
f(ω)dµ0(ω) ≥
ˆ
Ω
f(ω)dµ(ω), ∀µ ∈ ∆2(Ω). (A.2)
By considering µ = 1
2
µ0 and µ = 2µ0, we conclude that
´
Ω
f(ω)dµ0(ω) = 0. We must
also have f(ω) ≤ 0, as otherwise there would exist a measure µ with ´
Ω
f(ω)dµ(ω) > 0,
contradicting (A.2). Hence, we have
0 =
ˆ
Ω
f(ω)dµ0(ω) =
ˆ
{ω: f(ω)<0}
f(ω)dµ0(ω) =⇒ µ0 ({ω : f(ω) < 0}) = 0
which is a contradiction when µ0 has full support because the set {ω : f(ω) < 0} is non-
empty and open. Thus, we conclude that φ 6= 0. This implies that φ > 0 since the set A is
unbounded from below in α.
Therefore, we can divide the two sides of equation (A.1) by φ to obtain
V̂ (µ0)−
(
Φ
φ
)
µ+
(
Φ
φ
)
µ0 ≥ V̂ (µ),∀µ ∈ ∆2(Ω).
Define V (µ) = V̂ (µ0) −
(
Φ
φ
)
µ +
(
Φ
φ
)
µ0 to be an affine continuous function on ∆(Ω). We
have that V (µ0) = V̂ (µ0) and V (µ) ≥ V̂ (µ) for all µ ∈ ∆(Ω). Thus, V is a supporting
hyperplane of V̂ at µ0.
The converse of Theorem 5 does not hold, as the next example shows.
Example 1. Let Ω = [0, 1], µ0 = δ0/2 + λ/2 where λ is the Lebesgue measure on [0, 1],
and V̂ (µ) =
´
[0, 1]
f(ω)dµ(ω) where f(ω) =
√
ω. The function V̂ is affine and continuous
(since f is continuous), and thus it is concave and upper semi-continuous. Moreover, V̂ is
superdifferentiable everywhere (with the supporting hyperplane V = V̂ ); so the persuasion
problem is regular.
Consider µn = δ1/n/2+λ/2. By the definitions of weak
? convergence and the Kantorovich-
Rubinstein metric, we have µn
w→ µ0 and d(µn, µ0) = 1/(2n). Since V̂ (µn) − V̂ (µ0) =√
1/n/2, we have
V̂ (µn)− V̂ (µ0)
d(µn, µ0)
=
√
n→∞,
showing that V̂ does not have bounded steepness at µ0.
We now provide a simple sufficient condition on the primitive function V for V̂ to have
bounded steepness.
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Proposition 3. If V is Lipschitz continuous, then V̂ has bounded steepness at µ0.
Proof. Recall that
V̂ (µ0) = inf{H(µ0)|H : ∆(Ω)→ R, H ≥ V, H is affine and continuous}.
Because the infimum is taken over affine functions that lie everywhere above V , when V is
L-Lipschitz continuous, it is without loss of generality to only consider affine functions that
are also L-Lipschitz continuous:
V̂ (µ0) = inf{H(µ0)|H ≥ V, H is affine and L-Lipschitz continuous}.
It now follows from the Arzela´-Ascoli theorem that the infimum is attained at some H?.
Clearly, H?(µ0) = V̂ (µ0) and H
?(µ) ≥ V̂ (µ) for any µ. We thus have, for any µ,
V̂ (µ)− V̂ (µ0)
d(µ, µ0)
≤ H
?(µ)−H?(µ0)
d(µ, µ0)
≤ L
which shows that V̂ has bounded steepness at µ0.
Finally, we use Proposition 3 to show that a sufficient condition for V to be Lipschitz
continuous in the moment persuasion problem is that v is Lipschitz continuous.
Proposition 4. In the setting of Section 4, if v : X → R is Lipschitz continuous, then the
persuasion problem is regular.
Proof. Since we can redefine the state as m(ω), without violating any assumption in Sections
2 and 4, it suffices to prove the lemma for the case m(ω) = ω.
Suppose that v is L-Lipschitz. By Proposition 3 and Theorem 5, it is enough to prove
that the function V (µ) = v(Eµ[ω]) is Lipshitz continuous. We have, for any µ, η ∈ ∆(Ω),
where ρ denotes the metric on Ω,
V (µ)− V (η)
d(µ, η)
=
v(Eµ[ω])− v(Eη[ω])
d(µ, η)
=
v(Eµ[ω])− v(Eη[ω])
ρ(Eµ[ω], Eη[ω])
ρ(Eµ[ω], Eη[ω])
d(µ, η)
≤ Lρ(Eµ[ω], Eη[ω])
d(µ, η)
.
Because we have assumed that Ω ⊂ RN , we can take the uniform metric on Ω
ρ(Eµ[ω], Eη[ω]) = max
i=1,...,N
∣∣Eµ[ωi]− Eη[ωi]∣∣.
Because the function f(ω) = ωi is bounded and Lipschitz continuous on the compact domain
21
Ω, there exists a constants L′ such that
∣∣Eµ[ωi]− Eη[ωi]∣∣ = ∣∣∣∣ˆ
Ω
ωid(µ− η)(ω)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ L′d(µ, η).
Therefore,
ρ(Eµ[ω], Eη[ω]) ≤ L′d(µ, η),
and thus V is Lipschitz continuous with a constant L · L′.
B Omitted Proofs
B.1 Proof of Theorem 1
To prove the first part, note that the constraint in (D) implies
ˆ
∆(Ω)
ˆ
Ω
P (ω)dµ(ω)dτ(µ) ≥
ˆ
∆(Ω)
V (µ)dτ(µ).
The constraint in (P) and Fubini’s theorem imply
ˆ
∆(Ω)
ˆ
Ω
P (ω)dµ(ω)dτ(µ) =
ˆ
Ω
P (ω)dµ0(ω).
Combining these two conditions gives (G).
We now prove the second part. Consider any other feasible τ˜ ∈ ∆(∆(Ω)). By the first
part of the theorem, ˆ
∆(Ω)
V (µ)dτ˜(µ) ≤
ˆ
Ω
P (ω)dµ0(ω).
Combining this inequality with (O) gives
ˆ
∆(Ω)
V (µ)dτ˜(µ) ≤
ˆ
∆(Ω)
V (µ)dτ(µ),
showing that τ is an optimal solution to (P).
Similarly, consider any other feasible P˜ ∈ C(Ω). By the first part of the theorem,
ˆ
Ω
P˜ (ω)dµ0(ω) ≥
ˆ
∆(Ω)
V (µ)dτ(µ).
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Combining this inequality with (O) gives
ˆ
Ω
P˜ (ω)dµ0(ω) ≥
ˆ
Ω
P (ω)dµ0(ω),
showing that P is an optimal solution to (D).
B.2 Proof of Proposition 1
Suppose first that the objective function V is continuous. Then, the conclusion follows
immediately from standard results by treating the problem (D) as the primal problem.12
If (D) is treated as a primal minimization problem in the space of continuous functions
on a compact domain Ω endowed with the topology of uniform convergence, then it follows
that (i) the problem (P) is the topological dual of (D), and (ii) for any µ0, there exists a
P feasible for (D) such that
´
Ω
P (ω)dµ(ω) lies in the interior of the feasible set, that is, is
bounded away from V (µ) uniformly (because V is upper semi-continuous, and thus bounded
by some V¯ , it is enough to take P (µ) = V¯ + , for all µ, for some  > 0). The proposition
follows from Theorem 3.13 in Anderson and Nash (1987).
For the case when V is only upper semi-continuous, we can use an approximation argu-
ment developed by Villani (2009) and adapted to the linear persuasion problem by Dizdar
and Kova´cˇ (2019). Because we study a general persuasion problem and because (D) need
not admit an optimal solution even for a continuous V , we present the complete argument
below.
By Tong (1952), using the fact that the space ∆(Ω) is perfectly normal (because it is
a metric space, see p. 45 of Aliprantis and Border, 2006), we can approximate the upper
semi-continuous function V by a monotonically non-increasing sequence Vk of continuous
functions (in particular Vk ≥ V for all k). For every k, we know from the first part of the
proof that there is no duality gap. Using the fact that the problem (P) with objective Vk
has an optimal solution τ ?k , this means that there exists a sequence of function P
j
k feasible
for (D) such that ˆ
∆(Ω)
Vk(µ)dτ
?
k (µ) = lim
j→∞
ˆ
Ω
P jk (ω)dµ0(ω).
Because the sequence {τ ?k} lives in a compact set, we can assume without loss of generality
12Dizdar and Kova´cˇ (2019) were first to reverse the roles of the primal and dual problems to show that
there is no duality gap in the linear persuasion problem (in which the objective function depends only on
the expected one-dimensional state).
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that τ ?k → τ ? in the weak topology. Then, we have, for any l,
ˆ
∆(Ω)
Vl(µ)dτ
?(µ) = lim
k→∞
ˆ
∆(Ω)
Vl(µ)dτ
?
k (µ)
≥ lim sup
k→∞
ˆ
∆(Ω)
Vk(µ)dτ
?
k (µ) = lim sup
k→∞
lim
j→∞
ˆ
Ω
P jk (ω)dµ0(ω),
where we have used the fact that Vk ≤ Vl for k ≥ l. By the monotone convergence theorem,
lim
l→∞
ˆ
∆(Ω)
Vl(µ)dτ
?(µ) =
ˆ
∆(Ω)
V (µ)dτ ?(µ),
which gives us ˆ
∆(Ω)
V (µ)dτ ?(µ) ≥ lim sup
k→∞
lim
j→∞
ˆ
Ω
P jk (ω)dµ0(ω).
But because
´
Ω
P jk (ω)dµ(ω) ≥ Vk(µ) ≥ V (µ), each function P jk is feasible for the problem
(D). Thus, by weak duality, we also have for any j and k,
ˆ
Ω
P jk (ω)dµ0(ω) ≥
ˆ
∆(Ω)
V (µ)dτ ?(µ).
Therefore, there is no duality gap.
B.3 Proof of Existence of an Optimal Solution to the Problem (P)
Because Ω is a compact metric space, by Theorem 15.11 in Aliprantis and Border (2006), the
space ∆(Ω) is also compact and metrizable in the weak? topology. By the same argument,
∆(∆(Ω)) is compact in the weak? topology (with ∆(∆(Ω)) treated as the dual space to the
space of continuous bounded real functions on ∆(Ω)). Because the function τ → ´
∆(Ω)
µdτ(µ)
is continuous, the set of distributions that satisfy the constraint in (P) is closed. A closed
subset of a compact space is compact, and thus the set of feasible measures τ is compact.
By one of (equivalent) definitions of convergence in the weak? topology, the function
U(τ) =
´
∆(Ω)
V (µ)dτ(µ) is upper semi-continuous whenever V is upper semi-continuous and
bounded from above. By assumption, V (µ) is upper semi-continuous in the weak? topology
on ∆(Ω), and it is bounded from above because ∆(Ω) is compact.
Therefore, by Weierstrass theorem, U admits a maximum on the set of feasible measures.
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B.4 Proof of Corollary 1
If (C) holds, and τ satisfies the constraint of (P), then (O) holds. Thus, τ and P are optimal
solutions, by Theorem 1. Conversely, if τ and P are optimal solutions, then, by Proposition
1, (O) holds, which, together with the constraint of (P), gives
ˆ
∆(Ω)
(ˆ
Ω
P (ω)dµ(ω)− V (µ)
)
dτ(µ) = 0.
Since P is feasible for (D), the integrand is non-negative and thus (C) follows.
B.5 The Converse of Proposition 2
We maintain the additional assumption imposed in the converse of Proposition 2. We also
maintain the notation used in the proof of Proposition 2.
Lemma 6. The support of G is ordered: for all x, x′ ∈ supp(G), either x′ ≥ x or x ≥ x′.
Proof. Suppose that there exist unordered x, x′ ∈ supp(G) that have probabilities β, β′ > 0,
so that either (x′1,−x′2) > (x1,−x2) or (−x′1, x′2) > (−x1, x2). Then, we can strictly increase
the objective by pooling x and x′, because
(β + β′)
βx1 + β
′x′1
β + β′
βx2 + β
′x′2
β + β′
− βx1x2 − β′x′1x′2 = −
ββ′
β + β′
(x′1 − x1)(x′2 − x2) > 0.
More generally, if the support of G is not ordered, then there exists a strictly positive measure
of unordered pairs x, x′ ∈ supp(G). By the above argument, we can strictly improve the
objective conditional on any such pair, and hence also in expectation.
Lemma 7. If p defined by (5.3) is continuous and convex on Ω, then x2(θ) = ax1(θ) + b for
all θ and some b ∈ R.
Proof. Let ω, ω′ ∈ int(Ω), θ 6= θ′, and λ ∈ (0, 1). Denote
δ = θ′ − θ,
ε = ω1 − x1(θ),
ε′ = ω′1 − x1(θ),
γ =
a(x1(λθ + (1− λ)θ′)− x1(θ))
(1− λ)δ ,
γ′ =
a(x1(θ
′)− x1(λθ + (1− λ)θ′))
λδ
.
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Since supp(G) = {(x1(θ), x2(θ)) : θ ∈ Θ} and x2(θ) + ax1(θ) = θ for all θ ∈ Θ, Lemma 6
implies that x1(θ), x2(θ) are non-decreasing in θ and thus γ, γ
′ ∈ [0, 1].
Since p is convex on Ω, we have
0 ≤λp(ω) + (1− λ)p(ω′)− p(λω + (1− λ)ω′)
=λ(1− λ)δ
[
(1− 2γ′)ε′ + (2γ − 1)ε+ 1
a
(
(γ′)2 − (1− λ)(γ′ − γ)2) δ] ,
where the equality holds by rearrangement. Since x(θ) ∈ int(Ω), there exists r > 0 such that
δ
[
(1− 2γ′)ε′ + (2γ − 1)ε+ 1
a
(
(γ′)2 − (1− λ)(γ′ − γ)2) δ] ≥ 0, ∀ ε, ε′, δ ∈ [−r, r]. (B.1)
If γ 6= 1/2, then (B.1) is violated at ε′ = 0, ε = −rsgn(2γ−1), and δ = min{r, ra|2γ−1|/2},
as follows from
(γ′)2 − (1− λ)(γ′ − γ)2 ≤ (γ′)2 ≤ 1.
If γ′ 6= 1/2, then (B.1) is violated at ε = 0, ε′ = −rsgn(1−2γ′) and δ = min{r, ra|1−2γ′|/2}.
Thus, γ = γ′ = 1/2; so, for θ, θ′ ∈ (θ, θ), we have
x1(θ
′)− x1(θ) = 1
2a
(θ′ − θ)
and
x2(θ
′)− x2(θ) = θ′ − θ − a(x1(θ′)− x1(θ)) = 1
2
(θ′ − θ).
Finally, since p(ω) is continuous on Ω, we get that x(θ) is continuous on [θ, θ] and the above
equations hold for all θ, θ′ ∈ [θ, θ].
The examples below illustrate that the converse of Proposition 2 fails without an addi-
tional assumption.
Example 2. Suppose that Ω is the segment of the line ω2 = ω1 from (0, 0) and (1, 1). Thus,
X = Ω is convex but has an empty interior. By Lemma 1 in Rayo and Segal (2010), full
disclosure is optimal. That is, revealing ω2 +2ω1 is optimal, but the induced posterior means
Ω belong to a line with slope 1 rather than 2.
Example 3. Suppose that Ω is the segment of the parabola ω2 = ω
2
1 from (0, 0) to (1, 1).
Thus, the support of G is a connected set, but it consists of the extreme points x2 = x
2
1
of X. By Lemma 1 in Rayo and Segal (2010), full disclosure is optimal. That is, revealing
ω2 + ω1 is optimal, but the induced posterior means x2 = x
2
1 do not belong to a line.
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Example 4. Suppose that the prior assigns probability 1/6 to each of the six states (0.1, 0.3),
(0.3, 0.1), (0.4, 0.6), (0.6, 0.4), (0.8, 0.9), and (1, 0.7). Thus, the support of G consists of
points (0.2, 0.2), (0.5, 0.5), and (0.9, 0.8), which are not extreme points of X, but they
do not constitute a connected set. By Lemmas 1–3 in Rayo and Segal (2010), it is opti-
mal to pool the following pairs of states: {(0.1, 0.3), (0.3, 0.1)}, {(0.4, 0.6), (0.6, 0.4)}, and
{(0.8, 0.9), (1, 0.7)}. That is, revealing ω2 +ω1 is optimal, but the induced posterior means
(0.2, 0.2), (0.5, 0.5), and (0.9, 0.8) do not belong to a line.
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